For best experience please turn on javascript and use a modern browser!
You are using a browser that is no longer supported by Microsoft. Please upgrade your browser. The site may not present itself correctly if you continue browsing.

This hybrid conference will take place in the Hybrid Learning Theatre and explore recent academic research in Economics and Operations Research on algorithmic collusion. What does the literature say? What are the mechanisms by which algorithmic collusion works? What empirical evidence is there of algorithmic collusion? And what can policy-makers or market designers do about it?

Event details of Algorithmic Collusion: working mechanisms
Date 14 December 2020
Time 14:00 -18:00

There has been a lot of academic debate in the area of pricing algorithms and competition and the extent to which algorithmic collusion presents an actual threat has not yet been demonstrated. In particular, a key question is to what degree and in which settings algorithms can sustain coordinated prices over competitive levels. Theoretical, computational and empirical papers in are showing that various forms of supra-competitive pricing may indeed emerge through the use of algorithmic pricing, sometimes through the use or adaptation of collusive strategies. This virtual conference will host several speakers working on novel projects related to the concerns around pricing algorithms and collusion.

Location: Hybrid Learning Theatre, University of Amsterdam (physically accessible and via Zoom)

Organisers: Timo Klein and Maarten Pieter Schinkel

Inquiries: Please email Timo Klein at


Papers and abstracts

Links to the papers or (extended) abstracts will soon be published here.